Security & Cryptography
Defense-in-Depth Architecture
Section titled “Defense-in-Depth Architecture”Every @vicacha-devs/strapi-plugin-* package is engineered against OWASP Top 10 and CWE security standards, validated by unit tests and our automated Security Judge.
| Security Control | Plugin(s) | Cryptographic / Validation Primitive |
|---|---|---|
| Ed25519 Digital Signatures | certificates |
Node.js node:crypto (crypto.sign(null, canonicalPayload, privateKey)) + canonical JSON serialization |
| HMAC-SHA256 Webhook Verification | donations, certificates |
crypto.createHmac('sha256', secret) + crypto.timingSafeEqual constant-time digest comparison |
| Salted PII Hashing & Masking | certificates, donations |
Per-serial SHA-256 salted national ID hashes + masked public verification (***-***-4821) |
| SSRF & Outbound URL Validation | certificates, media-feeds, tiptap-editor |
Strict HTTPS enforcement, RFC 1918/loopback blocklists, DNS pinning (undici), and capped response streams |
| HTML, Markdown & Attribute Sanitization | tiptap-editor |
DOMPurify + isSafeUrl checks, disallowed on*/srcdoc attribute stripping, and strict sandbox iframe allowlisting |
| Path Traversal & MIME Hardening | resources |
path.basename() sanitization, strict extension/MIME allow-lists, and Content-Disposition: attachment + X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff |
| CSV & Formula Injection Neutralization | bookings, events, certificates, donations |
Prefixes leading =, +, -, @, \t, \r cells with a safe single quote before CSV export |
| Token-Verified Public Mutations | bookings, events, inbox |
SHA-256 hashed cancellation, check-in, and double opt-in tokens stored as private: true attributes |
1. Ed25519 Cryptographic Signing (@vicacha-devs/strapi-plugin-certificates)
Section titled “1. Ed25519 Cryptographic Signing (@vicacha-devs/strapi-plugin-certificates)”When a certificate (plugin::certificates.certificate) is issued, its canonical payload (serialNumber, templateSlug, recipientName, nationalIdHash, issuedAt, issuerName) is signed using Ed25519:
import { createPrivateKey, createPublicKey, sign, verify } from "node:crypto";
export function signCanonicalPayload( canonicalJson: string, privateKeyPem: string): string { const privateKey = createPrivateKey(privateKeyPem); const signature = sign(null, Buffer.from(canonicalJson, "utf8"), privateKey); return signature.toString("base64url");}
export function verifyCanonicalPayload( canonicalJson: string, signatureBase64Url: string, publicKeyPem: string): boolean { const publicKey = createPublicKey(publicKeyPem); return verify( null, Buffer.from(canonicalJson, "utf8"), publicKey, Buffer.from(signatureBase64Url, "base64url") );}Any modification to the recipient name, issue date, or serial number invalidates the Ed25519 signature immediately during public QR verification (GET /api/certificates/verify/:serialNumber).
2. Constant-Time HMAC-SHA256 Webhooks (donations & certificates)
Section titled “2. Constant-Time HMAC-SHA256 Webhooks (donations & certificates)”Payment gateway webhooks (Wompi, Stripe) and e-signature webhooks (DocuSign Connect) verify signatures using crypto.timingSafeEqual to prevent timing side-channel attacks:
import { createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from "node:crypto";
export function verifyWebhookHmac( rawBody: string, providedHexSignature: string, secret: string): boolean { if (!secret || !providedHexSignature) return false; const expected = createHmac("sha256", secret) .update(rawBody, "utf8") .digest(); const actual = Buffer.from(providedHexSignature, "hex"); if (expected.length !== actual.length) return false; return timingSafeEqual(expected, actual);}3. Private Attributes & RBAC Permissions
Section titled “3. Private Attributes & RBAC Permissions”- All sensitive hashes (
cancelTokenHash,nationalIdSalt,optInTokenHash,internalNotes) are marked"private": truein their Strapi v5schema.jsondefinitions so they are never serialized in publiccontent-apiresponses. - Admin endpoints enforce granular RBAC action permissions (
admin::hasPermissions) registered during plugin bootstrap.